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 During the first decade of its existence, the Eurozone demonstrated a high 
level of economic growth (2.67% annually on average), performing relatively 
better than other large OECD economies. However, triggered externally, the 
European debt crisis challenged the currency union and tested its resilience. 
 Comparative political economy explains the fundamental roots of the 
European crisis in varieties of national institutional structures of member 
countries (north vs. south), which conditioned their asymmetric development 
trends over time and made the union susceptible to external shocks. 
Imperfections in the Eurozone’s governance construction to react effectively 
exacerbated macroeconomic divergence.  
 Increasing discrepancies were reflected in current account imbalances, 
inflation rates, and divergence in price competitiveness of output. Inability to 
devalue to restore the loss of competitiveness of the south countries, the 
absence of mechanisms to regulate divergence through flexible wages and 
fiscal transfers limited the room for manoeuvre.  
 Policy options are worked out to reduce macroeconomic imbalances, to make 
the union’s authorities effective in the case of possible financial and economic 
strains in the future, and most importantly to harmonise different political-
economic institutional settings of the north and south European economies to 
promote growth and sustainability of the union. 
 Due to growing popularity of right-wing nationalist parties on the political 
arena of many European countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Finland, the 
Netherlands), establishing a fiscal union which would provide the opportunity 
to use budget transfers between member states is the least feasible policy 
option among alternatives at the current stage. 
 A set of recommended measures includes:  
 in the short run – balanced fiscal consolidation, complemented by 
measures to support growth in the south with the opportunity to 
spread austerity conditions over a longer period;  
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 in the medium term – banking centralisation to prevent possible bank 
runs, and to secure the trust of investors in sovereign government 
solvency;  
 in the long run – structural reforms focused on promoting labour 
market mobility and wage flexibility, restoring the south economies’ 
competitiveness by increasing their productivity, developing 
institutional capacities for innovations, technologies, education, R&D, 
etc. 
 This recommendation is justified by recent studies showing that the northern 
export-driven economies, especially Germany, benefited most from the 
introduction of the single European currency (estimated at €1,893 billion for 
1999-2017), while southern demand-driven economies were not successful in 
the Eurozone (they caused a total loss of €6,392 billion).  
 It is expected that Germany, as a major actor in the Eurozone would not be 
interested in changing the current growth model due to internal political 
reasons (main constituency of the two largest parties in the country is export-
oriented companies). To this end, the success of reforms to build an effective 
and sustainable currency union very much depends on the European 
authorities’ political and diplomatic efforts to properly communicate the 
necessity of transformation to member states, constantly challenging their 
self-interested policy preferences. 
 If suggested reforms are not implemented, vulnerability of the Eurozone to 
sudden changes in market sentiment will remain, leading to a high risk of the 
break-up of the union with high economic and social costs, which is not 










Since its creation the single European currency union has demonstrated steady 
economic growth, outperforming on average the European Union’s 28 countries and 
other large OECD economies (USA, UK, and Japan). However, the global financial 
crisis of 2007-2008 hit the Eurozone, in particular having severely affected Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. This resulted in an economic crisis.          
Drawing on recent comparative political economic (CPE) research, this policy 
analysis argues that the fundamental roots of the European debt crisis are located in 
the following three constraints:  
i. varieties of political-economic institutional arrangements of member states;  
ii. the lack of fundamental mechanisms necessary to adjust diverging 
performance among member economies; 
iii. the Eurozone’s imperfect governance structure and different political agendas 
of member countries. 
The interplay of these constraints stipulated the Eurozone’s exposure to negative 
external shocks, which European authorities struggled to cope with.  
The structure of the policy analysis is as follows. First, Section 2 analyses economic 
tendencies among the Eurozone’s member states over the period 1998-2008, and 
reveals the causes of the crisis based on optimal currency area (OCA) and varieties 
of capitalism (VOC) frameworks. Section 3 is focused on policy options to address 
the issues emphasized in the previous section. Section 4 then discusses side-effects 
and barriers to the implementation of policy recommendations. Lastly, Section 5 
concludes with final recommendations and provides justifications.   
 
2. Analysis of the problem 
The theory of optimal currency areas    
The theory of optimal currency areas, OCA (McKinnon, 1963; Mundell, 1961; 
Mundell & Swoboda, 1969) put forward the three conditions which have to be met 
for a stable monetary union:  
1) No economic divergence in member economies; 
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2) Flexible labour and goods markets, as well as mobility of workers between 
participant countries; 
3) Budget centralisation for fiscal transfers between member states.  
Condition 1 implies that changes in competitiveness between member economies 
should be limited to avoid possible imbalances. Condition 2 explains how under a 
monetary union macroeconomic divergence can be restored by flexible wage and 
price adjustment and effective labour distribution. Condition 3 requires a budgetary 
union among member states, which allows income transfers from members in good 
economic condition to members having financial or economic troubles (Paul De 
Grauwe, 2013; Mundell & Swoboda, 1969).            
In 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty was signed, European economies were not well 
coordinated, the common labour market was not flexible enough (e.g., compared to 
the US market), and the European Union’s budget had not enough funds for possible 
fiscal transfers: the budget was less than 1 percent of the union’s total GDP vs. up to 
20 percent in the United States (Iversen et al., 2016). Thus, at the stage of monetary 
union creation OCA conditions were not satisfied due to the prevalence of politics 
over economics that put the member states under a high risk (Paul De Grauwe, 
2013) due to the absence of mechanisms for adjustments (Krugman, 2013).   
However, even though OCA-based explanations of the Eurozone crisis are 
mainstream in economics (Schelkle, 2017), they do not capture the comparative 
political-economic aspects of institutional differences among member states from a 
CPE perspective, which explain the root causes of the European debt crisis.    
The varieties of capitalism framework 
According to recently developed varieties of capitalism (VOC) framework, the two 
groups of countries in the Eurozone can be identified as: Germany, Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, and the Netherlands, which are described as coordinated market 
economies (Hall & Soskice, 2001) or European ‘north’; and such economies as 
France, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain, which are named ‘peripheral’ 
economies or European ‘south’ (Iversen et al., 2016). The features of these two 





Table 1. Eurozone members from VOC perspective  
Characteristics European north 
European south  
and periphery 
1. VOC classification Coordinated market 
economies (CMEs) 
Liberal market economies 
and mixed market economies 
2. Economic model Export-oriented Demand-led 
3. Main interest in the 
common currency  
A stable exchange rate 
regime to promote exports 
Low inflation rates, 
stimulating investments 
4. Labour market 
flexibility 
Coordinated bargaining,  
and consequently restrained  
wage growth 
Union fragmentation, and  
as a result little capacity  
for wage restraint 
5. Macroeconomic 
policy preference 




Source: Adapted from Iversen et al. (2016) 
 
Since the introduction of the Euro currency in 1999 till the emergence of the world 
financial crisis, in 2007-2008, both groups of economies have benefited from the 
union: CMEs – from a stable exchange rate regime that promoted exports without 
the necessity to devalue the currency, southern economies – from low inflation 
rates, provided by the Maastricht entry requirements that stimulated investments. 
The two complementary economic models have led to successful macroeconomic 
outcomes in the single currency area, despite the absence of OCA conditions 
(Iversen et al., 2016): over the period 1999-2008, the eleven economies performed 
relatively well in terms of GDP growth (2.67% on average), and outpaced other large 
OECD economies – the USA (2.64%), the UK (2.59%), Japan (1.04%), OECD total 




Diagram 1. Economic performance of the Euro area and other OECD countries, 
indexed real GDP growth (1998=100)  
 
Source: Own calculations using OECD data (https://stats.oecd.org) 
However, a hidden problem associated with different political-economic structures 
of member states eventually made itself known in macroeconomic divergence 
between the north and south economies. Imbalances can be seen in terms of 
changes in price competitiveness of products expressed by unit labour costs across 
the Eurozone countries (Diagram 2).  
Institutional framework with coordinated bargaining allowed CMEs, especially 
Germany and Austria, to effectively hold down labour costs and benefit from export-
driven growth strategy within the currency union (Hall, 2014; Moschella, 2014; 
Muellbauer, 2013). Meanwhile, LME and southern economies, particularly Ireland, 
Spain and Portugal, tied by the single monetary union and inflexible exchange rate 
regime, have significantly lost in the competitiveness of their output (by 30-60% 
over 1998-2008) and were unable to devalue the currency to offset the inflationary 
pressure from demand-driven growth. Overall, southern countries’ institutional 
structure characterised by weak unions was not appropriate to be economically 






















Diagram 2. Unit labour cost index in Eurozone countries (1998=100)  
 
Source: Own calculations using OECD data (https://stats.oecd.org) 
Diagram 3. Current account balance 
as % of GDP, average for 1998-2008 
Source: Own calculations using World Bank 
data (https://data.worldbank.org) 
 
Increasing macroeconomic asymmetries 
were expressed also in current account 
balances (Diagram 3) and inflation rate 
discrepancies among member economies. 
For instance, the introduction of the euro 
currency has made Austria better-off in 
terms of its current account balance, while 
Greece, Italy and Spain’s current account 
positions significantly deteriorated (Hope, 
2016). 
At the same time, without a flexible 
exchange rate regime, inflation divergence 
was inevitable and permanent process, 
intensified by different monetary policies 
(tight vs. expansionary), that made the 
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The interaction of constraints 
We have seen that two theories – OCA and VOC – set constraints for the effective 
functioning of the monetary and currency union. In our view, these two theories are 
complementary. To be clear, if VOC explains the root causes of the crisis in Europe 
lying in the varieties of national institutional set-ups of member states that 
reinforced their macroeconomic divergence (the first constraint), OCA describes 
mechanisms which could be used to adjust this divergence (the second constraint).     
However, none of these mechanisms have been in place in the European currency 
union. Inability to devalue, flexible wages could have helped to adjust the loss of 
competitiveness in the southern European mixed-market economies (the OCA 
condition 2), which requires some move towards more flexible LME-type wage-
setting system (Hall & Soskice, 2001). Alternatively had the monetary union been 
embedded in a fiscal union, it would have used income transfers between member 
states to reduce macroeconomic imbalances and provide a buffer against 
asymmetric shocks (the OCA condition 3).  
The Eurozone’s imperfect power structure (Begg, 1998), the conflict of interests 
(Hall, 2014) due to having different internal agendas of political leaders in member 
states aggravated the problem, have made it difficult for decision makers to take 
effective and operative anti-crisis management decisions (the third constraint). 
As a result, the interplay of these described constraints conditioned the 
transformation of external shock into an inimical mixture of financial, sovereign 
debt, and economic crises in the Eurozone. The current account deficits in south 
European countries as indicators of foreign capital inflows to finance internal 
consumption-driven growth translated into unsustainable external debt and actually 
led to a classical balance of payments crisis (Krugman, 2012b; O’Brien, 2013). Due to 
government bailouts of afflicted financial institutions, external (initially mostly 
private) debt eventually transformed into sovereign debt crisis (McKinsey Germany, 
2012), while macroeconomic imbalances and a lack of adjustment mechanisms 
created pressure on the labour market and pushed member states into recessions, 
which in turn further worsened public debts and deficits and contributed to financial 
instability (Blundell-Wignall, 2012; Paul De Grauwe, 2013). 




3. Policy options  
Based on our analysis, there are three key policy issues that have to be addressed:  
1) What measures are needed in the short-term to reduce macroeconomic 
imbalances in the Eurozone countries;    
2) What should be done in the mid-term to make the union’s bodies effective in 
the case of possible economic tensions in the future; 
3) How to harmonise different political-economic institutional set-ups of the 
north and south European economies to promote economic growth and make 
the currency union sustainable in the long run.  
Some of these issues were considered to a greater or lesser degree (Appendix 1). 
Although the European authorities have taken a set of measures, which helped to 
regain the trust of markets (as seen in Appendix 2), important institutional and 
structural reforms are yet to be realised.  
Therefore, to address the above mentioned policy issues, the following policy 
options should be considered. 
Short-term measures 
Stable and effective functioning of the currency union depends on both the 
European Commission and the European Central Bank’ (ECB) actions. Given their 
acknowledged efficiencies (Fuertes et al., 2015), such current mechanisms as the 
Outright Money Transaction (OMT) and The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
should be implemented onwards.  
To improve balance of payments in countries with large current account deficits 
(e.g. Portugal, Greece, Spain, Ireland), further fiscal consolidation is inevitable. 
However, this policy option could lead to supressed demand growth and is tied to a 
risk of recession, as will be explained in Section 4. Therefore, the European 
Commission should consider the opportunity to spread austerity requirements over 
a longer period (Paul De Grauwe, 2013) with the gradual convergence to ‘fiscal 
compact’ rules (Blundell-Wignall, 2012), overall pursuing, which may be referred to 
as ‘balanced’ fiscal consolidation policy. 
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More bank centralisation  
The ECB should play more active role as a lender of last resort for all member 
countries in both banking and government bonds markets. Even though the ECB 
already acts in the sovereign bond markets through OMT, it is important to officially 
set up his status of a lender of last resort. It would bring a strong psychological 
effect to markets securing the confidence of investors in sovereign government 
solvency and prevent possible bank runs in times of turmoil (Paul De Grauwe, 2013; 
Iversen et al., 2016; Wyplosz, 2011).
2
   
Taking into account that bank liabilities in member states are much larger than their 
economies – from around 180% of GDP in Italy and Spain to more than 600% of GDP 
in Ireland – national central banks are, a priori, not able to compete with the ECB, 
which has access to actually unlimited amounts of euro cash. The European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) definitely helped to quiet markets down, however due to its 
caped funds (at around €700 billion)3, it also cannot substitute for the ECB (De 
Grauwe, 2011). 
Establishing a fiscal union  
A sustainable monetary union should go along with a fiscal union, which includes a 
higher degree of economic governance, centralised tax, redistributive power, and 
enlarged regular budget for fiscal transfers to satisfy the OCA condition (Paul De 
Grauwe, 2013). A historical analysis shows that all solid monetary unions have had a 
mechanism of transfer payments to compensate for regional disproportions and 
imbalances (McKinsey Germany, 2012).  
Moreover, when it comes to coordinate the ECB’s interest rate policy with fiscal 
policy, interaction with a single budget authority instead of 19 authorities could 
significantly reduce transactions costs (Begg, 1998). 
Structural reforms 
The Eurozone member states must adopt structural reforms, aimed at promoting 
labour market mobility and wage flexibility, restoring the south’s economies’ 
competitiveness by increasing their productivity (this policy option is supported by 
                                                          
2
 As of today, the role of lender of last resort (LLR) is actually taken by 19 member national central banks through 
providing emergency liquidity assistance (ELA), while the ECB is responsible for checking and monitoring the national 
central banks LLR activities (see “What is a lender,” 2019).   
3
 Data source: European Stability Mechanism, 2019. 
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many research, e.g., Blanchard, 2015; Blundell-Wignall, 2012; Hall, 2018; Johnston 
et al., 2014; McKinsey Germany, 2012; OECD, 2009; Wyplosz, 2016). 
At the same time, it is vital to keep in mind that just putting emphasis on emulating 
LME’s wage-setting system to CMEs and mixed-market economies will not work. 
Therefore, apart from wage issues, structural reforms should be focused on 
developing capacities for innovations, technologies, education, R&D, etc., i.e. all 
institutional subsystems, crucial for firms’ success (Hall, 2018). In economies of the 
south special attention should be given to creating less labour-intensive industries 
to avoid price competition pressure from emerging low-cost countries (such as 
China) via an exchange rate channel (Hall, 2018; McKinsey Germany, 2012), and 
providing a smooth transition of workers from old unsustainable industries to new 
ones based on the so-called Nordic-style ‘flexicurity’ market model (Schubert & 
Martens, 2005).  
It should be acknowledged, that this policy option is not novelty: it was on the 
political agenda of the European authorities and member countries.
4
 However, 
structural reforms were not properly addressed so far, especially in Greece 
(Blanchard, 2015), which suffered most from the crisis.    
 
4. Possible side-effects and barriers   
The implementation of the policy option associated with the ECB’s more active role 
as a lender of last resort has two potential side-effects. First, it has been said that 
when the ECB buys bonds it blows up the money base that increases a risk of 
inflation. Nevertheless, there is empirical evidence that during financial and 
economic crises this risk is minimal thanks to money supply not growing in pace with 
money base, since banks and people do not actively spend money; in actuality, 
there could be even deflationary pressure (De Grauwe, 2011; Friedman & Schwartz, 
1961).  
The other side-effect relates to a moral hazard issue when the presence of a large 
lender of last resort could incentivise national governments to issue too much debt. 
However, this problem can be addressed by imposing fiscal rules to member states’ 
governments (De Grauwe, 2011). In addition, there is possible institutional barrier to 
                                                          
4
 E.g., structural reforms were put forward within assistance programmes (Wyplosz, 2016). The German government 
executed the so-called ‘Agenda 2010’ programme in their country, focused on labour market and welfare system 
reforms to boost productivity growth (McKinsey Germany, 2012). 
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any changes in the status of the ECB. This needs amendment of the EU Treaty, which 
is difficult to realize as it would require approval from all member states. Yet, P. De 
Grauwe (2013) claims that currently stipulated in the Treaty ECB’s right to ‘operate 
in financial markets by buying and selling marketable instruments’ might be enough 
for a formal role as a lender of last resort.       
The policy option of creating a fiscal union faces political barriers, as it means less 
sovereignty for its members, which is unlikely in the current political trends in 
European countries (Wyplosz, 2015). The fear to lose sovereignty was well seen in 
the UK’s Brexit case, while in Eurozone countries we see trend towards nationalism 
with a growing popularity of far-right-wing parties: Eurosceptical Alternative for 
Germany, National Rally in France, Freedom Party in the Netherlands, The Finns in 
Finland, Vox in Spain, and The League in Italy (“Europe and right-wing nationalism,” 
2019).  
When implementing structural reforms capable to improve competitiveness via 
liberalisation, political difficulties should be taken into account as well (Blundell-
Wignall, 2012). A key player in the union – Germany – that benefited most from the 
current growth model (Gasparotti & Kullas, 2019; Hall, 2012) would not be 
interested in changing a status-quo in the face of possible opposition from 
employers in the export sector, major constituents of the two largest parties in the 
country (Hall, 2018). However, political will and precedents of such reforms make 
this policy option quite plausible.     
Lastly, the policy measure on fiscal consolidation, which does not favour demand-
driven economies (Hall, 2018), is associated with potential social unrest and public 
backlash, what we have seen, for example, in Greece (“Greece crisis: Revolution,” 
2011). Besides, within this policy option, negative growth impact should be 
expected, which in turn could lead to recession, escalate banking problems and 
eventually undermine the benefits from fiscal adjustment (Blundell-Wignall, 2012). 
Some economists, such as Nobel laureate Paul Krugman, argue that austerity is not 
viable at all for the deeply depressed economies like Greece due to deterioration of 
real public spending. Of course, fiscal consolidation ensures export-led growth in 
CMEs, especially Germany (Iversen et al., 2016), at the expense of southern 
European economies suffering from slower economic growth due to a negative 
demand shock (Krugman, 2012a). Therefore, the European Commission should 
make efforts to find an equitable trade-off between economic interests of the 
Eurozone member states.  
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5. Recommendation and justifications 
There are no a panacea or magic wand to guarantee the strong Eurozone against 
future crises. Instead a successful strategy depends on a combination of measures 
suggested in Section 3.  
An additional, but extreme alternative would be for the southern mixed market 
economies to voluntarily exit the euro area. This would allow them to exploit the 
exchange rate (depreciation) to adjust their competitiveness. However, such an 
option is, though possible, not expedient to all member states (Hall, 2014), since it is 
associated with very high economic and social costs for them due to possible fall in 
living standards (Iversen et al., 2016) and financial struggles in the south, and 
currency appreciation and loss of competitiveness in the north economies 
(McKinsey Germany, 2012), and finally because of some ‘symbolism’ in the Eurozone 
membership (Hall, 2014). 
Therefore, given the barriers to implementation, discussed in the previous section, 
our recommendation would be to take short-term measures on balanced fiscal 
consolidation, focus on banking centralisation in the medium term, and stick to 
structural reforms in the long run. This is a challenging task, but these measures are 
more realistic and doable compared to a fiscal unification, and unavoidable on the 
path of developing a strong union. Notably, without structural reforms, the 
Eurozone will always be vulnerable to possible future banking and sovereign debt 
crises, and ultimately to inevitable breakdown (Blundell-Wignall, 2012; McKinsey 
Germany, 2012).   
Finally, additional justification for the necessity to implement our recommendation 
can be seen through the latest estimations of economic effects from the creation of 
the Eurozone, which proves that the common currency area benefited mainly 
Germany, but not southern and peripheral European economies. As Diagrams 4-5 
below show, sticking to the current growth model without institutional changes has 
led to net economic losses (in terms of per-capita GDP) for eight analysed states in 
the amount of €6,392 billion accumulated for the period 1999-2017 (Gasparotti & 
Kullas, 2019), as total economic losses in Italy, France, Portugal, Spain, Greece, and 




                                                          
5
 In their analysis Gasparotti & Kullas (2019) used the synthetic control method to estimate the deviation of actual 
per-capita GDP for analysed member countries vs. the counterfactual one, had the countries not joined the euro area. 
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Diagram 4. Economic benefit/loss from 
euro for member states, in € billion, for 
1999-2017 
Diagram 5. Economic benefit/loss from 
euro for member states, in % of 
Eurozone’s GDP in 2017 
  
Source: Own visualisation using Gasparotti & 
Kullas’s (2019) estimations 
Source: Own calculations using Gasparotti & 
Kullas’s (2019) estimations and data on Eurozone’s 
GDP (https://data.worldbank.org) and EUR/USD 
exchange rate (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/) 
 
Thus, to make the recommended strategy feasible, the European Commission using 
evidence-based research should convince southern economies to implement 
structural reforms and continue fiscal consolidation, and northern countries to 
reconsider a growth model within the Eurozone, while CME governments (especially 
German) should effectively communicate the benefits of the new strategy to their 



































Appendix 1. Implemented anti-crisis measures and their description 
Main measures  Amount  Brief description  
1. Financial assistance 
1.1. The European Financial 
Stabilization Mechanism 
(EFSM) 
Up to €60 
billion 
The European Commission’s emergency programme, financed by issuing bonds in capital 
markets 
1.2. The European Financial 




A temporary emergency programme, financed by issuing bonds that are guaranteed by 
the member countries represented in the Economic and Financial Affairs Council 
1.3. The European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) 
€700 billion A permanent intergovernmental financial institution as a successor to the EFSF, which can 
buy sovereign debt in both primary and secondary markets  
1.4. Bailout programmes to 
Greece, Spain, Ireland, 
and Portugal 
~€625 billion These countries received assistance through different schemes, including EFSM, EFSF, 
ESM, as well as IMF loans    
2. Banking supervision 
2.1. The European Systemic 
Risk Board (ESRB) 
- Oversees the financial system and financial markets of the European Union to mitigate 
and prevent systemic risks 
2.2. The Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) 
- The European system of banking supervision, which consists of the ECB and national 
supervisory authorities of the participating countries 
3. Monetary measures  
3.1. Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) 
Unlimited  The ECB’s fully-sterilised programme on buying short-term government bonds in 
secondary markets under certain conditions  
3.2. Quantitative easing (QE) €2.6 trillion 
euros 
Non-standard monetary policy measures aimed at buying assets from commercial banks 
to boost economic growth 





Appendix 2. Eurozone debt crisis and measures timeline 
Source: Own visualisation based on ECB data on exchange rates (https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/); “Europe debt crisis timeline,” 2011; 
Lamborelle (2016); OECD data on interest rates (https://stats.oecd.org/) 
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